Florida Domestic Violence: Cyberstalking Petition
Posted by Nydia Streets of Streets Law in Florida Domestic Violence
What qualifies as cyberstalking in Florida? According to the Florida Statutes, it is “To engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person . . . causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” Fla. Stat. Chp. 784.048(1)(d). This was an issue in the case Strober v. Harris, 2D21-267 (Fla. 2d DCA January 5, 2022).
This case involved two YouTube publishers who ended up at odds with each other after one appeared on the other’s YouTube channel for an interview that became contentious. Thereafter, the parties each published videos criticizing the other. One party (who was a resident of Florida) eventually filed a cyberstalking petition, alleging that the other party (who was a resident of Georgia) sent her disturbing photos and messages, including death threats. The filing party also alleged that the alleged stalker directly threatened her through his social media channel and incited his followers to do the same. At a hearing on the petition, the alleged stalker requested a continuance, a request which he then withdrew at the same hearing, stating he wanted to “get this out of the way”. Before this, he argued the court had no personal jurisdiction over him. The hearing went forward on the merits with the alleged victim showing videos published by the accused substantiating her allegations. However, eventually, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction over the accused. The court also ruled that even if it had personal jurisdiction over the accused, “it would still deny the petition on the basis that [the alleged victim] failed to prove that [the accused] himself sent any of the videos or threatening communications directly to her.” The alleged victim appealed.
Dealing with the issue of personal jurisdiction first, the appellate court held “Here, despite an offer by the court of a continuance to allow him to challenge personal jurisdiction, [the accused] expressly declined in favor of a decision on the merits. Consistent with that stated choice, [the accused] never filed a written motion challenging jurisdiction or any supporting affidavits. Indeed, he failed to do so even though the trial court had advised him that his personal jurisdiction challenge ‘would have to be . . . in writing’ and even though he had initially responded that he intended to file a written motion within one week. Under these circumstances, [the accused] consented to jurisdiction by submitting to the court's authority and waived his earlier objection to personal jurisdiction.” The court also noted that aside from the accused’s consent to go forward on the merits, his alleged conduct met the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute for jurisdiction: “With respect to the first inquiry, under Florida's long-arm statute a nonresident defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of Florida courts for any cause of action arising from ‘[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.’ § 48.193(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). Florida law is well settled that 'committing a tortious act' within Florida under [the long-arm statute] can occur by making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into this State, provided the tort alleged arises from such communications.’” (internal citations omitted).
As to the second part of the trial court’s ruling that even if it had personal jurisdiction over the accused, it would deny the petition on the basis that there was no showing the videos published by the accused were sent directly to the alleged victim by the accused, the appellate court disagreed. The appellate court noted “[T]he statutory definition of cyberstalk includes not only messages ‘communicate[d]’ by a respondent, but also messages ‘cause[d] to be communicated’ as well.” The court held “Under the analysis applied by the trial court, however, the mere failure to establish that [the accused] himself sent the videos or threats directly to [the alleged victim] ended the inquiry. [. . .] As a result of this narrow interpretation of the statutory standard, the court disregarded [the victim’s] express allegations and evidence that [the accused] had ‘cause[d the threats] to be communicated’ with his videos, even though the court affirmatively found that she began receiving them only after appearing on [the accused’s] channel. The court also never addressed [the accused’s] statement—in a video entered into evidence without objection, admitted to be authentic, and played at the hearing—giving his viewers an ‘edict’ to harass [the alleged victim]. And, the court declined to determine whether the threatening messages purporting to be from [the accused] were ‘cause[d] to be communicated’ by him. Contrary to the trial court's interpretation of the statute, none of these issues were resolved by the discrete finding that [the alleged victim] failed to prove that [the accused] sent the threats himself.”
If you need help with a cyberstalking petition, schedule a consultation with a Miami family law attorney.